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FIRST PHILOSOPHY IN THE BORDER ZONE

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The article will be devoted to such problems as a idea of subsidiarity, a cosmopolitan right and a visitor figure in context and interpretation of ancient and modern philosophy. The article deals with the concept of subsidiarity which is taken as a point of departure for the discipline of borderology, an academic study with Kantian roots. Borderology, according to the principle of subsidiarity, can present as a new field of investigation which invites philosophers and social scientists to replace a “top down” with a “bottom up” procedure. The figure of the visitor is close linked with the experience of subsidiarity which means the freedom and initiative below the level of State. In Immanuel Kant’s strategy for perpetual peace, the figure of the visitor launches a critique of a tendency to self-aggrandizement, characteristic of the modern State and thereby a defense of the political independence of local border regions. The visitor also invites us to see, think and work to liberate our own subjectivity from false voices of sovereignty. Kant articulates the offer of the visitor by bringing in the term *Verkehr*. Using Kant scholar Otfried Höffe’s methodology we show how idea of subsidiarity is overlooked in international political theory, explain some constitutive principles of borderology, from which is more important is the methodological principle of an intercultural discourse and presents borderology as an anti-Huntingtonian model for border studies.

Keywords: borderology, border regions, cosmopolitan right, new first philosophy, subsidiarity, visitor.

Introduction

In this paper, I shall argue that the Kantian visitor is out on a serious, but neglected business of defending the Greek idea of subsidiarity, which grants a right for persons and regions to superior legal and State strategies.

Subsidiarity was used with great effect by Plato to dissolve the popular and still common

illusion that political power comes from above to be mercifully transformed to lower levels. The principle is here taken as a point of departure for the discipline of borderology, an academic study with Kantian roots. In Kant’s strategy for perpetual peace, the figure of the visitor launches a critique of a tendency to self-aggrandizement, characteristic of the modern State and thereby a defense of the political

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independence of local border regions. The visitor also invites us to see, think and work to liberate our own subjectivity from false voices of sovereignty. To engage with the visitor's perspective in the border zone means to view of Western civilization as part of an unlimited border zone covering the whole surface of the Earth. Due to this inspiration from the visitor, borderology transforms the writing of one's own subjectivity into a first philosophy.

1.

Kant is the first thinker who conceives of a *cosmopolitan* right (for the detailed comments on Kant's cosmopolitan thought see Kleingeld 2012). Even if the word "cosmopolitan" goes back to the Cynic and Stoic philosopher's discussion of human rights, the concept is new. This kind of right, according to Kant (1979b) establishes a relation between one single person, a visitor, and some foreign country, and is not a case of international right, that concerns the relation between States only.

The cosmopolitan right makes everybody into a citizen of the whole world, and implies a right to visit. The justification of the cosmopolitan right to visit is an important task if one wants to use Kant's ideas in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (German: *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, first published in 1795) (Kant 1979b) to launch borderology as a political theory with Kantian roots (see Rossvaer 2006; Shell 1980; Ripstein 2009).

The prevailing view is that border regions are potentially the source of crises, and may be well worth a philosophical peace initiative to prevent war. The corresponding view of the visitor would then be to see him as a representative for *folk diplomacy*. This interpretation is consistent with Kant's formulation of the cosmopolitan right: "The right of worldly citizens must be restricted under the circumstances of common hospitality" (German: *Das Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität*

eingeschränkt werden) (Kant 1979b: 357). But what does it mean, more precisely, to say that the cosmopolitan right is limited to the conditions of hospitality. Kant insists on calling the cosmopolitan right a *Besuchsrecht*, the right of a person to receive hospitality. But this use of words may be misleading. Even if Kant's language seems to lead in this direction, Kant himself makes it quite explicit that the visitor is totally different from any guest.

The visitor, according to Kant (1979b), has a right to knock on the door of a person he does not know. But he comes without an invitation, and he comes unannounced. A guest must behave according to certain conditions of mutual respect and concern that are clear to the invited person before the invitation. If the right of the visitor were a guest's right, his visit would relate to a contract defining a permission to contact the household or the persons he is visiting. In contrast to a guest, the visitor by Kant is given no right to physically enter foreign territory. The visitor only has the right to request interaction with other States and their inhabitants. He cannot cross the border unless he is granted permission by the authorities to do so, and the visitor is often not going far. The visitor is also by Kant (1979b) described as a stranger (*Fremdling*). He is not, as a visitor, automatically admitted into foreign territory. The visitor then might look like a refugee, or Orthodox monk, or simply a misfit. Many readers, therefore, have been lead to think of the visitor as basically a rootless person, and consequently to regard cosmopolitanism as an individual's calculated retreat from obligations and the rest of society?

Kant articulates the offer of the visitor by bringing in the term *Verkehr* (Kant 1979b: 358). The Kant scholar Höffe comments like this: "Kant's complimentary concept, how the implementation of the global civic law is taking place, consists in the subjective right to "offer oneself to others in exchange" (Höffe 2006a: 5). And he adds: "This concept of the visitor is not only commerce, but something more than that" (Höffe 2006a: 5). Höffe continues:

“The researcher may offer his knowledge, in the same way as earlier the trader and the missionary had goods and religion to offer as long as it is without recourse to force and violence. Provided the offer is made on foreign territory, the killing and enslavement of new arrivals is as much forbidden and prohibited as the opposite case of enslavement and exploitation of local subjects” (Höffe 2006a: 5).

This kind of description of the visit is consistent with the understanding of the visitor as carrying on by means of his example, a local or regional peace mission. This visitor can only attempt to offer his own company, and nothing more. But the somewhat strange sounding words of offering oneself to others in exchange, is introduced in such a way that it leads to a surprising geographical change of context. Kant defines *Besuchsrecht* as a right “that is entitled for all human beings to offer itself for the society according to the right of community possession around the whole Earth” (German: *welches allen Menschen zusteht, sich zu Gesellschaft anzubieten, vermöge des Rechtes des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzes der Oberfläche der Erde*) (Kant 1979b: 358). The offering of oneself in exchange or “to offer itself for the society” (German: *sich zu Gesellschaft anzubieten*), is justified by reference to the visitor’s right to go anywhere he likes on the whole Earth. The visitor, it seems, is on a peculiar peace mission – reminding people of the same universal right.

Kant’s justification of the visitor’s right in *Perpetual Peace*, therefore, seems to be based on a very brute fact concerning the behavior of mankind. The justification of the right of the visitor lies with the shape of the globe. If the Earth had been flat, people could constantly have avoided conflict by moving away from each other. As it is, people are clustered together in complex communities over geological time and are forced to meet each other under dramatic geographical and historical conditions that make it impossible to turn one’s back to one another and run. The roundness of the Earth makes every human being into a potential

visitor. The basis of Kant’s cosmopolitan right, therefore, is that nobody on Earth originally has more right to a certain place than another. The surface of the Earth is limited in extension and this limitation confers on every man the right to a friendly reception when entering another person’s land. Every piece of land is a part of the surface of the globe. Therefore, as long as the visitor behaves friendly on this sphere, he cannot be treated as an enemy. The right to make a new arrival provides him with protection from those who are already living there. Kant’s reference to the globe, however, is often regarded as picture to stimulate one’s own fantasy, not as a strict argument. The same goes for the corresponding figure of the visitor. Therefore, just to preserve some force of Kant’s argument one often falls back on the idea of the visitor as executing some kind of regional office, acting on behalf of regional authorities.

For one thing, the visitor’s visit is more than the presentation of an argument for a certain right. His act of offering his *Gesellschaft* is more than a mere presentation of an argument, it is also appears as a demonstration for peace.

The Kantian right of the visitor to visit some foreign country, then seems to depend on the strength and traditions of a different kind from those one can find in particular cross-border cultures. Cross-border responsibilities are binding on the inhabitants in many border regions, with rules transcending the borders of nationality. This is the basis of local movements of protest, when for instance regional politicians on both sides of a common national border unite and take action to fight against the economical agreements and deals of powerful superior national politicians, situated far away in the respective national parliaments and capitals. To sum up, the justification of the visitor peace project could be based on the existence of particular strong border cultures. People of such cultures, are in spite of belonging to different nationalities, sharing cultural and ecological roots and commitments on more than one side of the national borderlines. But the problem

of justifying the visitor as a messenger for *perpetual* peace does not seem to be fully solved by this move. Then we have to fall back on “nobody has more right to a certain place on the Earth than another”.

The problem with the justification of the visitor’s errand is that Kant seems to give the visitor a stronger and more global justification of his right, stronger than any right dependent on particular cross-border cultures only. But if the idea of this Earthbound right is not simply presupposed just for the sake of argument, how is it to be justified?

This article is an attempt to take seriously Kant’s presentation of it as an idea whose justification might be explained by reference to border-related practice. I think one can justify the visitor’s right by starting with the old concept of subsidiarity, originally a legal concept justifying rights beneath the level of State.

2.

In 2006, Höffe was invited by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes to lecture on Kant and borderology. Höffe’s paper, “Borderology: Four philosophical Principles with Kantian Roots”, opened with the question: “What is the challenge to which borderology tries to give the response?” (Höffe 2006a: 2). And he gave the following answer:

“In my opinion it might be the fact that our globe is entirely divided into political entities which claim full sovereignty on their territory thus making rather sharp eliminations. These are visible in differences in legal orders, a different police, often in different currencies, languages, manners, even in the alphabet” (Höffe 2006a: 2).

Most of these separating factors, he went on, are determined, or at least deeply influenced by the political centers:

“But though these separating factors are actually widely accepted, they are not considered the last word. The world creates a colourful

bunch of trans-national cooperation in economical, social and cultural affairs. After a certain time and supposing a certain denseness of cooperation, there may arise new entities, at first of an informal, later of a formal type” (Höffe 2006a: 2–3).

According to Höffe (2006a), the principle of subsidiarity is of great importance for border regions, since it grants a right for a region to superior legal and State strategies and even entitles them to trans-national cooperation (Höffe 1996, 2006a). It allows the establishment of relevant strategic organizations without asking trans- or supranational institution. In the Kirkenes region it is enough that Russian and Norway and maybe Finland are consulted.

Borderology, according to the principle of subsidiarity, can, according to Höffe (1996, 2006a), be presented as a new field of investigation – inviting philosophers and social scientist to replace a “top down” with a “bottom up” procedure – a procedure not often associated with Kantian philosophy. Höffe lists four constitutive principles of borderology, and it is in this context he presented the principle of subsidiarity. First there is “the methodological principle of an intercultural discourse”. Then there are three substantive principles, “the principle of peace, the principle of commerce in a broad sense, and the principle of subsidiarity – as the initiative of commerce does not have to come from the state authorities, but may be put forward by individual groups and political entities below the state” (Höffe 2006a: 5).

Local patriotism based on knowledge of a complex historic experience, is no hindrance for engagement in peace work. On the contrary, it follows that Kant’s visitor implies a type of self-consciousness in which the emotions and feelings of local “Earthbound-ness” or cultural patriotism generated by border regions may provide legitimate initiatives. Such initiatives, namely, “does not have to come from the state authorities, but may be put forward by individual groups and political entities below the state” (Höffe 2006a: 5). The local culture leads,

without being instructed from the outside, to an insight of “public law attaining its fulfilment in a global civic, respectively cosmopolitan right that does not replace, but complement national civic law” (Höffe 2006a: 4). Therefore, just by virtue of a strategy with moderate aims not initiated by the nations themselves, the local culture can be a motor for future cooperation and peace in the North. It must be right therefore to say that the Kantian idea of perpetual peace is connected to the idea of regional independence – thanks to the principle of subsidiarity. Kant’s reference to the Earth’s roundness actually seems to mean that the local world is constituted from below and that a shared feeling of *subsidiarity* is loaded into the social setting. The roundness of the Earth, then, provides man with a special togetherness that is politically important and legally challenging. Professor Höffe concluded in this way: “An institute of borderology, then, can be a global workshop for the creation of new solutions the traditional, central authorities are not likely to see for themselves” (Höffe 2006a: 4). It can be a model for border projects over the whole world. The visitor’s offer “in exchange”, is the offer of being part of a kingly people?

According to Höffe (2006b), the principle of subsidiarity is the basic justification of the visitor’s right. But since the force of this justification seems to come from particular border cultures, the universality of this right might easily be questioned. It comes from one particular geographic part of the globe, and is not dependent on connection with the whole surface of the globe as such. The question is now if Höffe’s interpretation (see Höffe 2006b) reduces the weight of Kant’s argument in the *Perpetual Peace* as an argument for perpetual peace. Certainly perpetual peace is something different from peace in a local region? Regional peace cannot be supposed to be Kant’s aim in the *Perpetual Peace*. Peace in many regions of the world may after some time create a peaceful world State. But Kant is famous for his denial of the peacefulness of a single world State, which

implies that he cannot argue for the idea that in the end a unification of all border regions of the world into one single State. Summing it up: The right of the visitor is generated by the roundness of the globe, that is, from the Earth and world he stands on, not by actually getting the official permit to cross the border. Subsidiarity only goes some way towards the solution to the problem of the justification of the visitor’s right. Höffe’s argument leaves us with an unsolved problem: Supposing that subsidiarity can convince people about their common ownership to the globe, how can this be leading to action for the establishment of a *perpetual peace*.

3.

One paradox about Höffe’s interpretation is that the principle of subsidiarity is not explicitly referred to by Kant in the *Perpetual Peace*. According to Höffe, the idea of subsidiarity is also very much overlooked in international political theory (1996, 2006b). In the Early Middle Ages the principle of subsidiarity is formulated more explicitly, but mainly as a principle of social ethics, used to defend the rights of the individual. According to social ethics, the principle shall protect individual rights by considering the individual’s role in society on analogy with organs of a body. Every organ of the body is relatively independent, but still playing a necessary role, like say, a foot or a hand or central organs like the brain and heart in relation to the body as a whole. This analogy between limb or organ on the one hand and individuality on the other indicates a basic kind of respect or right for individuals. It does not define a requirement for personal glory and happiness for outstanding persons only, but is a requirement for the treatment of everybody according to his personal worth and dignity, giving each single person his proper place in society. Both the analogy with the body and the concept of superiority itself seems to have disappeared from relevant political theory concerning social subjects after

the Middle Ages. Its most interesting and representative occurrences in modern times seems to be in the Maastricht Treaty, where subsidiarity is mentioned two times to qualify the authority of the European Union (EU) in relationship to its member States.

It is interesting to note that this reawakening is due to a pressure from some of the North-Eastern parts of the EU. These countries have all of them old federal traditions and are not first and foremost influenced by centralized Rome and the Latin countries, but from ancient federal Greece, making it look as if politicians in countries with strong federal traditions more easily can see the relevance of the subsidiary principle. Paradoxically enough, the idea of subsidiarity has its ancient roots in Plato's *Republic*. The very principle of subsidiarity, much debated in antiquity, comes originally from there. In the *Republic* (1967: II, 369b), Plato insists that the individual is not self-sufficient, but in need of many others, implying that the community has no rights of its own, but instead serve individuals. Plato's formulation makes it possible to understand why the principle of subsidiarity caused so much debate among Greek philosophers, not least in Aristotle, but also why it later disappeared from view as a political principle. The disappearance of subsidiarity can be explained by reference to the importance of another concept, the concept of sovereignty. In the *Republic*, Plato also seems to launch the opposite ideal of the philosopher the King, who by virtue of his education is the only qualified leader of the State. Platonic leadership of the State has a different use for the analogy of the body. The sovereign's concern of the other inhabitants of the State as individuals is built into the kingly leader's sovereignty as excellence and his competence for dialogue. In an ideal State where the conduct of government is based on dialogue, and not law, the concern of the lower level by those positioned on the upper level, is already solved by reference to the philosophers sovereign competence. Consequently, the principle of subsidiarity is superfluous.

But is the disappearance of the principle of subsidiarity from political theory is a special concern for Kant? It would not be too surprising if it was, since he compares the State with a person. More specifically, in the *Perpetual Peace* he ends by making it clear that in the just State, every inhabitant is the King (Kant 1979b). The inhabitants of the just State make up what he calls "a kingly people". Kant's use of terms seems to imply that wants to turn Plato's idea of sovereignty upside down, and reintroduce the principle of subsidiarity in his political philosophy. Kant's philosophy of perpetual peace is grounded on the principle that legal morality should rule public affairs. A kingly people, therefore, are distinguished from other peoples not by learning, but by their laws. Outstanding persons cannot as such qualify as just leaders and Kings, but should in their entirety, be replaced by those who are both affected by, and responsible for the affairs of the State. Only because a kingly people is being subordinated to a "law of equality" do they have a just society, that is a society in which no one can bind another to something without also being subject to a law by which he in turn can be bound in the same way by the other (Kant 1979b: 350). The principle of subsidiarity here seems to be built into the idea of a society of kingly people.

As mentioned before, in his later years, Kant also strongly argued against his own earlier, and more Platonic, visions of the development of the political world in the direction of a single world State. Because of man's corruption, such a State could be the most devilish instrument of repression ever created by man. I think one can understand Kant's viewpoint in this matter, if one considers that in a just State one needs the principle of subsidiarity as a necessary supplement of the principle of sovereignty. Kant probably saw that no perpetual peace and no kingly people are possible if the society is organized only according to the principle of sovereignty.

From an historical point of view, sovereignty is related to the State's control of power within geographically defined borders. Here

subsidiarity disappears from view. The excellence of a leader of such a Republic in many cases becomes associated with the very ability of making a legal exception for himself. The history of such excellence is starting with the famous Lucius Junius Brutus, the founder of the Roman Republic. Brutus introduced political law and order in his Republic by killing the earlier Kings of Rome. But later he made an exception for himself according to the same laws by killing both his sons – to save the Republic from chaos. Brutus is the favorite example of Niccolò Machiavelli, who in Brutus sees the political commitment of the true Prince perfectly concretized. Sovereignty is here presented only as control from a central power, placing the leader nearly beyond the human realm. Any kind of legitimation from below is eliminated from the ruler's perspective. The principle of subsidiarity is replaced by pragmatic considerations only.

Another more modern example of removing subsidiarity from view is Jean Bodin, who transferred the old Roman ideal into the Christian tradition, reformulated the sovereignty of the King's rule as indivisibility. In his *On Sovereignty: Six Books on the Commonwealth* Bodin defined the idea of sovereignty as indivisible, belonging to one individual or group (2009). The sovereign may in Bodin's case become the victim of a special illusion of false sovereignty. In the practice of government, he has to delegate power to regional leaders. But as practitioners of indivisibility, the regional leaders are no longer just servants of the King (as in Roman Law), but become "colored" by the King's own indivisibility. Due to the concept of power as indivisible, subsidiarity in politics now is understood as an invisible property of nobility, and again disappears from view. Now, according to Bodin, it is looked upon as a property beyond the ordinary social realm, whereas ordinary human beings who lack this quality, are considered as the property of the King and God (2009).

History seems to suggest that a strongly organized sovereign State, gives no support for

the concept of subsidiarity. It is probably this insight that leads Kant to replacing the single world State of his early vision, with a cosmopolitanism based on the loose organization of States in a world Republic. To reintroduce the concept of subsidiarity he has to introduce the visitor as an agent for this social and mental change. Independently of Kant's own view, subsidiarity attracts interest. To do away with subsidiarity in the organization of a just Republic, is to threaten national sovereignty. Therefore, it becomes important to open a supplementary dimension usually overlooked in international politics (with exceptions also in the EU), as a form of free initiative below the level of State. But is the introduction of subsidiarity sufficient to justify perpetual peace on a global scale?

4.

Höffe presents borderology as an anti-Huntingtonian model for border studies. This discussion is important for borderology, since it concerns the justification and implementation of Kant's ideas of peace at the regional level.

When the border between Norway and Russia was finally made clear in 1826 by the Swedish/Norwegian King Charles XIV John of Sweden and the Russian Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, it was designed to separate people of Russian Orthodox faith, from people of Catholic/Lutheran faith. Since that it has been seeping up impressions from two great historical events, the Russian/Norwegian Pomor Trade, and the Litza Front in the Great Patriotic War. Therefore one should expect, according to Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (2011) that a study like borderology in the border zone would be a totally misplaced and impossible attempt to bridge a cultural ravine. Huntington's main point concerning the meeting of civilizations is a view of human history according to which the wars, which used to take place, first between feudal lords, then between

nations and later between ideologies, will from now on take place between civilizations (2011). Even if Höffe admits that a lot of violence, and even wars is caused by the conflict of cultures, borderology might, he thinks never the less be considered a strategy to prevent the outbreak of war, due to its strategy of cooperation across borders (2006a). Höffe explicitly mentions three things: First, the model of

“borderology defines itself as away from the main centres, and [...] is based on small scale projects. Second, it follows flexible principles, and does not force other regions to adopt specific rules. Thirdly, it is based on a look and see policy, that is, a policy of let us see how it functions and what the advantage is” (2006a: 11).

The opening of the joint master study between Norway and Russia in 2010 can in itself be used as contra-evidence against Huntington. The advances of borderology seems to Höffe to go under the radar of the Huntington's theory, based as it is on the study and classification of large scale projects, and nobody could have foreseen that the experience of teachers and students on the Russian and Norwegian side in the border zone is exhibiting the border zone as an enormously rich world opening for the experience of the other. Even if this is an unusual thing to say, the student of borderology by writing subjectivity is trying to share the surface of the globe with the other. That is, the student is adjusting his moral illusions of sovereignty by applying the principle of subsidiarity to his own situation, bringing in the figure of the visitor by transforming the border into a bridge.

Even today people in the Eastern parts of Europe feel closer to the ancient Greek federalism, than to the Roman centralism in the Latin countries in the West. The remnants of the federalist Greek city-States are still alive in Eastern Europe, and as instruments for solving conflicts, they should contribute positively to the Kantian idea of a world Republic. Kant does not want a rigid Utopia without conflicts, but a living Earth always struggling for more and more democratic ideals. He will not go to any

extremes to avoid conflict, but provides us with a policy to solve them when they appear. He is not as a pioneer for a world of total harmony, but as a defender of perpetual peace based on local patriotism, in spite of never ending border conflicts.

5.

Even Höffe, in his criticism of Huntington, tends to overlook that a border or a border zone is much more than a line of a map; that borders of civilizations runs through people (2006a). The clashes of civilizations in border areas exist as writings on mental maps showing the inhabitants' commitment to principles belonging to more than one civilization. The internal commitment to conflicting principles, however, does not lead to war, but is responsible for the inhabitants common border identity. So far as I can see, mental structure of this kind is especially relevant for Kant's description of the visitor's right. They are deeply engraved in the inhabitants subjectivity as the products of constant collisions, repeated in time and space over the ages between people who are forced to live together, due to the Earth roundness. But it is the not superficial identity of a common cross-border culture that primarily binds together the inhabitants of different nationalities in peaceful cooperation in the border zone. The experience from the study of borderology tells us a more complicated story (see Rossvaer 2006). In borderology the students start to work by writing out their subjectivity. Students who tries to write their first essay about the experience of feeling at home on foreign ground in Nikel, will immediately begin to recognize that the homely “border zone identity” is part of a more extensive and unknown identity. In their attempts to write out their subjectivity, the students are first confronted with a surface-identity – with long and deep roots extending on both sides of the Norwegian/Russian border. Of course, the hidden roots of such a homely surface identity

attract the stronger interest. But the first feeling of uncomplicated homeliness also reveals something different. Like the justification of subsidiarity in the Middle Ages the particular local identities of fingers and limbs, are part of the much wider context of a much greater body. The students may feel like the victims of a change. In such a search for the roots of the homely feeling, new elements of context and outer history becomes added to it, changing the identity of the feeling, making the students see themselves in a new way. But they had to write it out as text to discover it. This is a hard practice. With something like a clash, the students realize that they are part of a more complex and unknown civilization. They are confronting unknown elements in their own make up that maybe never before were fully exposed. When borders binds together, and run through persons and subjectivities they can only be exposed as seems of the public space. Otherwise they cannot inform us about the letters of laws that commit us, even if they are offering us the right to belong on the surface of the Earth.

Kant seems to agree with borderology when he asserts that the visitor's right has to be established in a practice. Kant sees the visitor's right as being established through a long process, from "unrecorded codex for the contract of all nations" (German: *ungeschriebener Kodex zur Vertrag aller Völker miteinander*) (Kant 1979b: 360). This process from subjective idea to objective fact has its parallel in the students' activity is to write their subjectivity, and thereby the visitor's kind of *Verkehr* is already brought into the zone. As Kantian visitors, the students try to break away from established centralized way of thinking and seeing. Writing subjectivity may, as I see it, be able to modify the prevailing idea of *sovereignty*; that is, balance it with an ingredient of patriotism for the local region, in an effort to exhibit the right and feelings of subsidiarity. This practice of borderology confirms Professor Höffe's conclusion: "An institute of borderology, then, can be a global workshop for the creation of new solutions the traditional, central

authorities are not likely to see for themselves" (2006a: 5). But writing subjectivity is only possible through confrontations like a clash, even more fundamental that the clash described by Huntington.

Ulrich Beck argues for the importance of the border as an area establishing a regional form life as the new center. In this way he is visualizing a second modernity channeling the breaking up of the industrial society into new forms of living together (Beck 1995). The break with industrial society and the dependency of old "zombie" – concepts from the industrial era leads to a discovery of a new rationality hidden under the laws of the industrial society. One has to confront the social identity that is realized through the dependency of one's old concepts. Beck goes far in the direction of accepting this kind of liberation from dependency old concepts as characteristic of a second modernity, where people are themselves more responsible for creating their own biographies (Beck 1995). What we see in Beck is an extreme form of writing subjectivity cut away from its Kantian roots.

Jürgen Habermas, on the other hand sees any defense of subsidiarity as an inconsistency in Kant's idea of a federation of independent States. His argument is that human rights must be institutionalized by means of a world tribunal in ways that are binding on the various regional governments (Habermas 1997).

6.

"Kant's alternative is a global legal order which accepts the primary and lasting right of nations, may therefore be called a subsidiary and complimentary world republic" (Höffe 2006a: 5). Borderology, therefore, is not only a local, but a global alternative to the sovereignty of Western political culture (see Rossvaer 2006).

Kant's justification of subsidiarity, however, is not simply a matter of adding together firm and fixed block of established regional and national identity up in order to establish justice on

a world scale. According to the Stoic philosophers, who were strong critics of the practice of sovereignty in the Greek city-States, the inhabitants of one particular city with geographically defined borders, at the same time also lives in another city. For them the other city is their real home. Through the figure of the visitor, Kant is trying to interpret this Stoic ideal of the two cities as a drive for cosmopolitan peace. In the figure of the visitor he is linking the experience of subsidiarity, that is the freedom and initiative below the level of State, with the positive break-through of a feeling of unlimited and unconditional subjectivity as freedom.

This is demonstrated in his famous supervising of Thomas Wright. Kant is namely correcting Durham's observation of the Milky Way in his *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (German: *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*, first edition in 1755) as if Wright was a student without a clear vision of his own position as a scientific observer on the surface of the Earth. Kant's fame in astronomy is connected with his re-reading of the astronomer Wright's observation that most of the stars we can see are collected in a continuous band which forms a great circle in the sky (see Kant 2009). Now, a great-circle is a circle that can be drawn on the surface of a sphere. It is formed at the intersection of the great-circle and any plane that can be drawn through the center of the sphere. The Equator is a great-circle. Other examples of great-circles are the meridians. These stars constituting this great-circle Wright is speaking of are spread in a disc shape called the Milky Way (see Kant 2009). Even today one can see what Kant was driving at in his re-reading by taking a look at the stars on a clear winter night. Part of Kant's revolution in astronomy comes from seeing that Wright did not realize the full significance of what he saw.

As Kant himself tells the story, he was inspired to his discovery by the realization that the standard descriptions of the Milky Way in his days left out the obvious implication of the

observation (see Kant 2009). The Milky Way is not a screen but the example of a phenomenon that the Greeks condemned, namely an experience of the unlimited. You cannot reduce the unlimited space to a velvet screen with small lightening points. The curtain that stops astronomy from taking theory observations seriously must be drawn aside. Here the observer has an indispensable function. He must report that what we see is not only a disc-shaped concentration of stars, but also that this disc-shape is seen from the inside, that is from a standpoint near the center plane of the disc.

The transformation of the sky is a transformation where the known world is changing face into something hitherto unknown for the human observer. It is an experience of being a part of something unlimited, siding with the other in the same circle of the Milky Way. Suddenly participating in a scenery of which the observer did not expect to be a part. Kant describes an experience of being filled with a feeling of reverence for the universe. One can find confirmation for the importance of this feeling at the end (*Beschluss*) of Kant's own *Critique of Practical Reason*, where he in a famous passage seems to extend the meaning of the moral law just by referring to this kind of cosmic experience. In this passage, Kant insists that there are two things that still fills his heart with unbounded respect for humanity and its destiny, not only the Moral Law within him, but also the starry heavens outside him (Kant 1979a). That the starry heavens in the shape of the Milky Way are able to fill his heart with respect for humanity and its destiny is exactly the Kantian visitor is looking for. It provides a new feeling of subsidiarity under the sky that extends the visitor's world endlessly. The feeling extends a mere regional attachment and gives the regional attachment a character of being defined and confirmed by a cosmic tale.

Kant is comparing the moral meaning of the categorical imperative with the single observer's feeling of being integrated as a subject in an endless universe above him, taking a final step in his Copernican Revolution of moral

philosophy by permitting nature to have its say in the liberation from moral illusions (see Kant 2009). The view of the Milky Way will make us better understand Kant's view that the roundness of the Earth provides man with a special togetherness that is not only politically challenging, but also revolutionary for the question of man's place in Cosmos. The roundness of the Earth keeps men of their feet and supports all men with an idea of having a common playground under the Milky Way. This human condition is available for all men, as a shared cosmic support that confirms the experience and feeling of subsidiarity as a respect for other persons. Subsidiarity here contains a dimension that invites perpetual peace.

7.

Subsidiarity in the last instance refers to an experience of endlessness under the stars. The individual hope for perpetual peace is connected with a feeling that binds individuals to their particular Earthly regions in virtue of an experience of cosmic endlessness. According to this cosmic perspective, introduced in the *Beschluss*, it makes itself felt as an emotion connected with the opening of a view of the unlimited cosmos. Even if Kant's here is taking his point of departure in a Stoic model, this kind of experience of the Earth in this sense was not open for the Stoic philosophers. Kant (2009) announces a break with the ban on the Unlimited originating with the Greek civilization. When the visitor is offering himself to other in exchange, to use Höffe's formulating, he is communicating a respect for people hidden in the experience of cosmic endlessness. When subsidiarity is loaded up into a global context, modelled on a moral experience, the unlimited character of the planetary universe comes up as the model for moral and legal recognition of the Other. This legitimization of the visitor's *Verkehr* as a justification of a perpetual and not just a regional peace, at the

same time is a decisive move from regional politics into first philosophy. Regional man is now coping with a feeling of contact with the unlimited and unknown space. He is breathing in under the starry heavens, his feelings of subsidiarity have found a new at home under the Milky Way. Subsidiarity now takes us to a point where the traditional Western ideal of individuality breaks down and announces a new first philosophy. The visitor comes to a point where the Other is recognized through a cosmic context, where one's own life is felt as Unreplacable. Your right to the surface of the globe is justified because it gives you something that is not replaceable to live for.

At the opening of the Bakhtin-Kant Institute in 2012, the main speakers interpreted the emotions evoked by the event as a feeling of *sobornost*. *Sobornost* is a Russian word for a feeling of cosmic community and unity with one's closest neighbors, a word which Kant as a citizen of the German/Polish/Lithuanian/Russian city of Königsberg should be well acquainted with.

Conclusions

The concept of subsidiarity which is taken as a point of departure for the discipline of borderology, has a long tradition of academic study with Kantian roots. Borderology, according to the principle of subsidiarity, can present as a new field of investigation which invites philosophers and social scientist to replace a "top down" with a "bottom up" procedure. At the same time, Kantian justification of subsidiarity is not simply a matter of adding together firm and fixed block of established regional and national identity up in order to establish justice on a world scale;

The figure of the visitor is close linked with the experience of subsidiarity which means the freedom and initiative below the level of State. In Kant's strategy for perennial peace the figure of the visitor launches a critique of a tendency to self-aggrandizement, characteristic of the

modern State and thereby a defense of the political independence of local border regions;

Kant seems to depend on an old Greek principle of subsidiarity in his description of the conditions for a perpetual peace. This thesis is supported by his elaboration of the concept of the visitor, even if it is difficult to see if Kant has made this figure sufficiently clear. Kant's main idea seems to be that all men are united in the same *oikōs*, and therefore that there is a global *oikōs* that binds sovereign States into a federal unity;

Kant is the first thinker who conceives of a *cosmopolitan* right. This kind of right establishes a relation between one single person, a visitor, and some foreign country, and is not a case of international right and concerns the relation between States only. The cosmopolitan right makes everybody into a citizen of the whole world, and implies a right to visit. The justification of the cosmopolitan right to visit is an important task if one wants to use Kant's ideas about perpetual peace to launch borderology as a political theory with Kantian roots. This interpretation is consistent with Kant's formulation of the cosmopolitan right what means that the cosmopolitan right is limited to the conditions of hospitality;

The Kantian right of the visitor to visit some foreign country depends from the strength and traditions of particular cross-border cultures. Consequently, the justification of the visitor peace project could be based on the existence of particular strong border cultures. People of such cultures, are in spite of belonging to different nationalities, sharing cultural and ecological roots and commitments on more than one side of the national borderlines. But the problem of justifying the visitor as a messenger for *perpetual* peace does not seem to be fully solved by this move;

Using Kant scholar Höffe's methodology we show how idea of subsidiarity is overlooked in international political theory, explain some constitutive principles of borderology, from which is more important is the methodological

principle of an intercultural discourse and presents borderology as an anti-Huntingtonian model for border studies.

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PIRMOJI FILOSOFIJA PARIBIO ZONOJE

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Straipsnyje gvildenamos tokios problemos, kaip subsidiarumo idėja, kosmopolitinė teisė ir lankytojo figūra antikinės bei moderniosios filosofijos kontekste ir interpretacijose. Straipsnyje nagrinėjama subsidiarumo samprata, kuri vertinama ribologijos disciplinos, kurios šaknys yra Immanuelio Kanto studijos, kontekste. Remiantis subsidiarumo principu, ribologiją galima pristatyti kaip naują tyrimų sritį, skatinančią filosofus ir socialinių mokslų atstovus procedūrą „iš viršaus žemyn“ pakeisti procedūra „iš apačios į viršų“. Lankytojo figūra yra glaudžiai susijusi su subsidiarumo patirtimi, reiškiančią laisvę ir iniciatyvą žemiau valstybinio lygmens. Kanto amžinosios taikos strategijoje lankytojo figūra sukelia savęs išaukštinimo tendencijos, būdingos moderniajai valstybei, taip pat ir vietinių paribio regionų politinės nepriklausomybės, kritiką. Lankytojo samprata taip pat ragina mus matyti, mąstyti ir dirbti, siekiant išlaisvinti mūsų pačių subjektyvumą nuo apgaulingų suvereniteto tipų. Kantas artikuliuoja lankytojo konceptą, pateikdamas *Verkehr* sąvoką. Pasitelkiant Kanto raštų tyrinėtojo Otfriedo Höffe's metodologiją, parodoma, kaip subsidiarumo idėja interpretuojama tarptautinės politikos teorijoje; paaiškinami tam tikri svarbiausi ribologijos principai, kuriais remiantis didelė svarba teikiama metodologiniam tarpkultūrinio diskurso principui. Ribologija pristatoma kaip antihantingtoniškas paribio studijų modelis.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: ribologija, paribio regionai, kosmopolitinė teisė, naujoji pirmoji filosofija, subsidiarumas, lankytojas.